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Introduction 
On the night of October 15th, 2011 a group of about twenty young Cypriots 
marched in Nicosia towards the Green Line, separating the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) 
from the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Shouting ‘One Cyprus’ and ‘We 
want to be together’ they occupied the Buffer Zone along Ledra Street, in the heart of the 
capital’s old city centre (Figure 1).1 At the beginning, the occupation was only periodical 
and temporary, as protesters were gathering in the Buffer Zone only in certain days for a 
few hours. Starting on November 19th, 2011 the occupation became permanent, as the 
activists organized a small makeshift camp with sleeping and eating facilities. Over the 
following months, the protest gained momentum, thanks also to its visibility on various 
online social networks and press coverage by local, national, and international mass-
media.2 Just a few days before its eviction by the GC police, on April 6th, 2012, 
OccupyBufferZone (OBZ) had a permanent sit-in of about 15-20 activists (who became 
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60-70 at night and even more during weekends) and more than 1,000 followers on social 
networks. Mainly young, women and men from TRNC and RoC, not organized around 
any leadership and dissatisfied with the inability of their political elites to reach a solution 
for the reunification of the island, the OBZ activists aimed at creating a space where ‘to 
live the solution’ to the Cyprus Problem, having indeed lived together for six months in 
an undivided space. 
Inspired by the mass protest known as ‘Arab Spring’ and by other world-wide 
Occupy movements demanding economic and social equality, OBZ has clearly been part 
of what Routledge and Cumbers (2009) call the Global Justice Networks (GJNs). Being a 
place-based movement, with a specific local agenda (namely, the reunification of 
Cyprus), it also articulates demands for global economic and social change.  
The aim of this article is to focus on the specific spatial practices of the OBZ 
movement. In this sense, I join the research endeavour initiated by Paul Routledge (1994; 
1996; 1998) aimed at studying the relationship between forms of resistance and places. 
More specifically, I am interested in the particular ‘terrain of resistance’ (Routledge 
1994) chosen by the OBZ movement. The Buffer Zone is indeed a place where the 
sovereign norm produced and enforced by the two states (RoC and TRNC) is suspended. 
Drawing on Constantinou’s (2008) post-colonial re-reading of Agamben’s (1998; 2005) 
state of exception, I argue that it is exactly this suspension of the sovereign norm which 
makes resistance possible. People gathering in the Buffer Zone are no longer subjects to 
the hegemonic norm of their respective states and make use of this exceptionality 
deliberately, as a way to re-write their ethnic, cultural, and political belonging. It is 
exactly this voluntary act of entering a space/state of exception which gives voice and 
 3 
visibility to their political claims, aimed at overthrowing the sovereign norm which they 
are escaping. In this sense, I concur with Constantinou (2008) and argue that, under 
certain circumstances, it is possible to think that a state of exception might become a 
condition of empowerment rather than mere dispossession and annihilation. Yet, one 
should also be careful not abstracting or idealizing this state of exception. The final 
eviction of OBZ activists reveals indeed the existence of ‘exceptions to the exception’ 
(Constantinou, 2008) through which the sovereign reinstalls a territorializing logic of 
power. 
I start my investigation by first offering a short overview of the Cyprus Problem 
and by discussing the specifics of the Buffer Zone and its exceptional status. I then 
analyse the OBZ movement and its practices of resistance, by mapping the multiscalar 
articulation of their protest, the performative use of the space they occupy, and the 
counter-exceptions aimed at ‘normalizing’ the exception when such exception does not 
respond anymore to the interests of the powers involved.3 I conclude by highlighting a 
series of theoretical considerations which, prompted by the specific experience of the 
OBZ movement, can elucidate further the notion of terrain of resistance. 
 
The Cyprus problem 
 
When in 1960 Cyprus gained its independence from the British colonial rule, the 
two major communities of the island - Greek Cypriots (GCs) and Turkish Cypriots (TCs) 
– had already developed deep nationalist affiliations with their respective ‘motherlands’, 
Greece and Turkey (Papadakis 2008). While GCs demanded and fought the British rule 
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in name of Enosis (‘union’ with Greece), TCs reacted by supporting the partition 
(Taksim) of the island. Exacerbated by opposite political aims and reciprocal suspicion 
and fears, in December 1963 Cyprus experienced its most intense bloody inter-communal 
violence. The following year, the United Nations deployed a peacekeeping force 
(UNFICYP) to prevent further fighting. Among the measures adopted, there was also the 
establishment of the Green Line, a de facto border separating the two communities in 
Nicosia. Being the main target of the 1963 violence, the TCs came to live in self-
constituted territorial enclaves (Akçalı 2009). The gradual return to inter-communal 
working and commercial life in the late 1960s was, however, interrupted abruptly in July 
1974 when, supported by the Greek military junta, a right-wing GC group deposed the 
President of the Republic of Cyprus and demanded Enosis (Papadakis 2005). This 
prompted the military intervention of Turkey and the actual partition of the island along a 
ceasefire line, again known as Green Line, this time running North-South through the 
whole island (Copeaux and Mauss-Copeaux 2006). 
As attempts to find a solution to the partition failed, in 1983 the part of the island 
north of the Green Line declared independence with the name of Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which until today has only been recognized by Turkey and put 
under embargo by the rest of the international community. 
Despite ongoing negotiations among the leaders of the two political entities and the 
support of the UN to favour the reconciliation of the parties through various bi-communal 
initiatives, over the last thirty years or so no significant steps have been made towards the 
creation of the bi-zonal and bi-communal federal state, which was the solution agreed on 
by the two parties in 1977 (Akçalı and Antonsich 2009). 
 5 
A great chance to solve the Cyprus Problem came in April 2004, when the UN 
Annan Plan for the reunification of the island was put under referendum (Heraclides 
2004; Sözen and Özersay 2007). This happened while both GCs and TCs were 
negotiating Cyprus’s membership to the European Union. Hoping maybe for the end of 
the embargo and a new future in the EU, 65 percent of TCs voted in favour of the 
reunification proposed by the Annan Plan. On the contrary, as the EU membership of the 
RoC was already secured and also due to the dissatisfaction with some of the concessions 
made to the other side by the Annan Plan, 76 percent of GCs voted against the 
reunification (Papadakis 2005). Consequently, only the RoC joined the EU, but in a 
rather contradictory move EU citizenship was also extended to TCs. 
In summer 2008, a new negotiation round started, but so far the parties have failed 
to reach any comprehensive agreement towards the reunification of the island. This 
somewhat reflects the sceptical attitudes of the majority of TCs and GCs, who, while 
remaining open to inter-communal negotiations, disagree on the actual measures to be 
adopted (Cyprus2105 2011). More recently, the RoC’s initiative to start oil and gas 
drilling in the eastern Mediterranean Sea has led to a tense diplomatic row with Turkey 
over the boundaries of RoC’s Exclusive Economic Zone, further complicating the 
negotiation process on the island’s future. This is also accentuated by the continuing 
Anglo-American presence in Cyprus which, besides Greece and Turkey, also have a 
geopolitical interest in the island, having played an important role in the events which led 
to its partition (Hitchens 1984; Joseph 1997) and still firmly quartered in the British 
sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia. 
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The Buffer Zone as a ‘space of exception’ 
 
The BZ, also known as Green Line, is an area which extends north-south for 
approximately 180 kilometres and covers about 3 percent of Cyprus’s land area. The 
width of this strip varies considerably, from only a few meters in Nicosia to a few 
kilometres in some rural areas. Its northern and southern limits do not constitute state 
borders, but only ceasefire lines, recorded by the UNFICYP on 16 August 1974, the day 
in which the belligerents stopped fighting.4 
Despite being labelled by the GCs as ‘Dead Zone’, the BZ actually hosts several 
villages or special areas, where more than 10,000 people live and/or work. While the 
access to these areas is free to civilians, other parts of the BZ, included the one within 
Nicosia, require instead UNFICYP authorizations for civilian movement and/or activities. 
Since April 2003, a number of crossing points, also within the historic centre of 
Nicosia (Ledra street), have opened, thus allowing the free flow of GCs and TCs, which 
until then was forbidden due to the resistance of TC authorities (Copeaux and Mauss-
Copeaux 2006; Peristianis and Mavris 2011). 
The BZ has a distinctive juridical status. As recalled by Constantinou (2008, 156), 
the UN has indeed created over this area a true ‘state of exception’. Constantinou uses 
this term somewhat differently from Agamben (2005). In the interpretation of the Italian 
philosopher, the state of exception is the “suspension of the juridical order” by the 
sovereign, who, following Carl Schmitt, is defined as “he who decides on the state of 
exception” (Agamben 2005, 1-4). Over recent years, Agamben’s work has become rather 
 7 
popular. Among geographers, in particular, the focus has been on exploring the spatial 
forms of the state of exception:  the camp (Minca 2005; Ek 2006; Bülent and Laustsen 
2006), the border (Lynn Doty 2007; Salter 2008; Basaran 2008), the prison (Martin and 
Mitchelson 2009), extra-territorial spaces (Gregory 2006; Comaroff 2007), and in-
between spaces (Morris 2003). 
Various authors have also suggested that in the present world the exception has 
been normalized or re-worked into a sort of biopolitical nomos (Minca 2006). Each of us 
can become homo sacer and thus being exposed and abandoned to violence (Gregory 
2006). 
While largely sharing these views, Constantinou (2008) aims to enlarge the scope of 
the conversation by re-reading the ‘state of exception’ in light of post-colonialism. He 
observes that very often the ‘de-colonized world’ was never given the choice between 
normality and exception, but only between different states of exception (Constantinou 
2008, 147). “For the postcolonial state – writes Constantinou (ibid.) - exceptionality as 
constricted sovereignty has often been systemic and endemic, underscoring 
exceptionalism not as a mere by-product of governmental ‘decrees of necessity’, but as a 
foundational act that was imposed and neatly combined with emancipatory pretensions.” 
In this sense, the state of exception is no longer a condition produced by the sovereign 
over its own territory, but by external powers over the new ‘b-ordered’ territory of the 
post-colonial state. 
Constantinou offers an original reading of Cyprus’s contemporary history as one 
made of multiple states of exception. Among them, Constantinou also includes the BZ. 
For him, its exceptionality emerges clearly from one of the periodical UN Secretary 
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General’s Reports (S/12253 - 1976), which stated “that neither side can exercise authority 
or jurisdiction beyond its own forward military lines” (Constantinou 2008, 156). The BZ 
is therefore a space of exception since on this space the juridical order of both RoC and 
TRNC is suspended. Within the BZ, the sovereign is the UN – a sovereign which, 
ironically, has neither territory nor people, but which, exceptionally, can claim both 
authority and jurisdiction over the BZ.  
At the same time, though, Constantinou refers to the existence of ‘exceptions to the 
exception’. A state of exception can indeed trigger counter-exceptions, “rationalized as 
resistance or liberation, or as attempts at normalization” (Constatinou 2008, 146). Within 
this perspective, a spiral of exceptionalisms is activated, which can provide interstices of 
manoeuvre for various actors, territorial and not, aimed at nullifying the norm and/or its 
exception. 
It is within this juridical and theoretical context that I locate my attempt to map the 
terrain and practices of resistance of the OBZ movement. While the ‘border’ in Cyprus 
has long been contested – most notably by the bi-communal and feminist-inspired ‘Hands 
Across the Divide’ group (Cockburn, 2004) - to my best knowledge, no other movement 
in the world has chosen to dispute the border ‘from within’. It is exactly the geopolitical 
uniqueness of this terrain of resistance which makes OBZ worth being investigated.  
 
 
OccupyBufferZone 
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The specific site chosen by the OBZ movement is a symbolically very dense space. 
For the GCs, the BZ represents a ‘Dead Zone’ (Papadakis 2008). Since 1974, the area has 
been indeed left untouched; until 2003, crossing was not permitted and those GCs who 
tried to violate this space were killed by Turkish soldiers. Mourning the loss of their 
relatives, villages and properties, GCs have dotted their side of the BZ in Nicosia with 
several monuments, plaques, photos and banners conveying feelings of both sorrow and 
resentment and calling for a right to return (Figure 2). On the northern side of the BZ, 
TCs have not equally memorialized their landscape, although this does not mean that they 
have not gone through the same sufferance caused by inter-ethnic violence (Bryant 
2010). On the contrary, at the Ledra Palace’s crossing, a more imposing check-point 
surmounted by the sign ‘TRNC Forever’ suggests that the BZ might be perceived by 
some TCs as a sort of protection (Figure 3) (Peristianis and Mavris 2011, 151).5 
In this sense, the BZ is clearly a site where the ‘performance of the border’ (Green 
2010) is associated with various re-enacting of memories, a representational space filled 
with often contrasting discourses, forces, beliefs, and symbols, which, for this very 
reason, transforms that space into a terrain of contestation and potential resistance to 
spatially and culturally contextualized powers (Routledge 1994, 560-1). 
Over time, the BZ has also been used, thanks also to the initiative of the UNDP, as 
a site to organize bi-communal events (Akçalı and Antonsich 2009). Recently, in May 
2011, RoC and TRNC presidents jointly opened in the BZ in Nicosia the ‘Home for co-
operation’, whose aim is to mutually discover the two different versions of history taught 
on the island.6 This latest bi-communal initiative, along with the fact that some NGOs 
and foreign cultural institutions (Goethe Institute; Fulbright Program) have chosen to 
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open their offices in the BZ, clearly speak of the BZ as a neutral space and, as such, a 
space of encounter. Yet, these initiatives implicitly confirm what they want to overcome, 
namely the existence of two distinct territories, two separated communities which indeed 
only meet at the border. 
The OBZ movement defies this bi-communal approach, claiming that it exactly 
perpetuates a divisive logic. As Green (2010, 261) aptly remembers, borders indeed 
generate the differences that they mark, rather than simply reflecting them. Accordingly, 
the OBZ movement challenges the idea of border tout court. ‘Borders are scars upon the 
Earth’s body’, ‘This is nationalism. No borders’, ‘UNBuffer Us’ are some of the slogans 
exhibited by the movement (Figure 4).7 Such a ‘no-borders’ discourse clearly speaks the 
language of anti-geopolitics activism (Routledge 1994), as it tries to achieve 
emancipatory change through conscious opposition to state-centred notions of power and 
identity, as well as global capitalism. The OBZ activists aim indeed “to raise awareness 
of how the Cyprus Problem is but one of many symptoms of an unhealthy global 
system”:8 “The Cyprus Problem is a world problem, as are all problems […] if we don’t 
change the world, we will forever be vulnerable to the consequences of a system that 
necessitates, rewards and promotes acts of aggression, greed and dishonesty. We cannot 
possibly hope to change an island in a world as unwell as this one, we could only ever 
hope to change the world.”9 In an interesting move from the local to the global, the OBZ 
movement therefore presents itself as one of the many Occupy movements world-wide, 
merging a context-specific demand (Cyprus’s reunification) with anti-capital, anti-state 
and eco-friendly stances. 
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The OBZ activists are clearly aware of the exception to the norm associated with 
the BZ. As mentioned in one of their Facebook posts, dated 03/12/2011, “There are many 
Cypriots from the North staying at the camp tonight to boycott what they feel will be a 
fixed census tomorrow. This is legal as you are "out of the country." This is an invitation 
to join them. Bring your tents!” Choosing to locate their resistance within a space of 
exception allows for new empowering practices, which defies b-ordering regimes of state 
power. As aptly portrayed by Sinan Dirlik, in a news article praised by the OBZ activists, 
in the BZ notions like nationality, religion, and authority are suspended: “Mihalis is a 
Greek. Turgut is a Turk. But in the buffer zone, Mihalis is no longer a Greek, nor is 
Turgut a Turk.”10 The exception is deliberately played out by the activists to organize 
their resistance. It also closely resonates with their ‘no-border’ discourse. It is indeed the 
fact that the BZ is a site of exception to the norm which b-orders space and people on 
both sides of the border which allows for transgressing that very norm. And it is also 
what allows them to put forward their project for a reunified island, where, in terms of 
identity politics, the ‘bi-communal’ is substituted with ‘multi-communal’: “Here we have 
Armenians, Latins, Maronites, Cypriots who speak Turkish and Greek […] so we can’t 
say two communities […] To be a Cypriot is a multi-cultural thing”.11 
The occupation of the BZ is also revealing of the importance of bodies in practices 
of resistance (Pile and Keith 1997). As it is well known, social networks have played a 
key role in mobilizing the ‘Arab Spring’ and the Occupy movements world wide, being 
crucial also in rallying support for the OBZ movement. Yet, the OBZ activists show the 
limits of ‘virtual’ revolutions: “So you clicked ‘Like’, but revolutions don't happen 
clicking away on Facebook, that's step 1. Step 2 is to show your face tomorrow. 6pm 
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Lidra Street Crossing south side, where we will gather before occupying the buffer zone 
[…]”.12 However crucial social networks might be today, they do not replace the need for 
real bodies which engage in earthy practices of resistance. “We need people to come and 
make things happen in this space […]. We need new people sleeping here to change the 
dynamics again and offer new energy, ideas and HANDS! We need participation”.13 
Sitting comfortably in front of a laptop and participating remotely cannot be a substitute 
for bodily, emplaced practices of resistance (Pile 1997). Through the bodily occupation 
of the BZ and the mundane activities associated with that occupation (eating, drinking, 
sleeping, singing, discussing, etc.), the activists broke somewhat a ‘taboo’ in Cypriot 
society, as observed by a local GC newspaper.14 Existing for almost forty years, the BZ 
has indeed become part of Cyprus’s ‘ordinary landscape’ (Meinig 1979), which as such 
goes unnoticed, having become ‘normal’ and, therefore, invisible (Demetriou 2007). The 
occupation of the BZ, by being itself an extra-ordinary act, brings again to visibility the 
exceptionality of the condition in which Cypriots live. Filling this exceptional space with 
ordinary practices is a form of resistance which, like the artistic interventions on the 
border recounted by Amoore and Hall (2010), interrupts sequences, habits, and rituals of 
living and re-producing, also for security purposes, the border(zone), while opening up 
space for alternative political projects. 
Following a long series of dissuasive measures put forward by TC and GC 
authorities, on April 6th, 2012, a GC anti-terrorist unit and drugs squad raided the OBZ 
camp, beating and arresting several activists.15 The GC police justified the raid on a 
search warrant after information that drugs were in a building illegally occupied by OBZ 
activists. Although officially the UNFICYP’s stance towards the OBZ movement had 
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spanned from an original sympathy to a more pragmatic toleration,16 de facto they sided 
with both the TC and GC authorities. Being itself a political actor, exposed to the 
pressures of RoC and TRNC authorities (Grundy-Warr 1994), the UNFICYP did not 
protest the violent restoration of the ‘norm’ by the GC police, officially claiming that the 
raided building was not located in the BZ.17 As Constantinou (2008) puts it, any 
exception is associated with counter-exceptions, giving way to a spiral of exceptionalisms 
where different dynamics of power are at play, which defy the simple binary logic of 
oppressor and oppressed often associated with a mainstream reading of Agamben’s. 
Severely hit by the police raid and strained by both the fatigue of six-month 
occupation and internal frictions, the OBZ activists finally lifted their camp at the end of 
May 2012. “We are now taking a pause; the eviction affected people psychology, so we 
need to recover; but the group is still there and so is the BZ; we are just taking time to 
see what to do next; OBZ is not over, it will never be.”18 
 
 
Conclusions 
Transgression is often the preferred form of resistance practiced by social 
movements (Foust 2010). By escaping the discipline of boundary-policing authorities and 
violating an ‘off-limit’ space, the OBZ movement also engages in performative practices 
of transgression which call for social, economic and political change. Its experience, I 
would argue, allows for a series of considerations which can illuminate further the notion 
of terrain of resistance. First, the OBZ movement offers evidence for going beyond a 
simple, binary logic which often characterizes how the notion of exception has been 
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operationalized. When located within the post-colonial context of Cyprus, the exception 
takes on new meanings, as the space where the norm is suspended becomes a terrain of 
resistance which challenges that very norm. The BZ is indeed both the object of 
contestation and the condition which allows for that contestation to take place. No longer 
the space where life becomes ‘bare life’ (Agamben 1998), exposed to violence and death, 
the exception is where the OBZ activists take refuge in. Second, confirming the insights 
from previous literature (Pile 1997), the OBZ experience reasserts the importance of 
emplaced and embodied resistance. However relevant online social networks might be 
today, resistance still happens both in places and through bodies. Third, and related to 
this point, emplaced resistance matters also because the alternative use of space made by 
the activists challenges the ‘norm-alization’ of space produced by the dominant power. 
Altering the everyday (non-)use of space as defined by a system of power is per se 
revolutionary. As space is imbued with power relations, any resistance to be successful 
should therefore aim at appropriating and making new spaces (Featherstone 2008; Pile 
1997). Transforming the BZ in an undivided space where Cypriots could live together 
questions the existence of two distinct territories and their respective political powers, 
thus triggering a violent act of re-territorialisation/re-normalisation. This elicits a fourth 
consideration, which also helps refining Agamben’s theory: any exception is associated 
with counter-exceptions, which can be exploited by both the territorialising/normalising 
power (as in the case of the GC police raid) and those who oppose it. Given the eviction 
of the OBZ camp as well as of other Occupy camps world-wide, a final consideration, in 
the form of an interrogative, should come forward: ‘what space is left today for 
resistance?’ This question clearly echoes the interrogative by Don Mitchell (2003) about 
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socio-spatial justice: who has access to space, why, and at what conditions? One way to 
answer this question is to recover De Certeau’s (1984) famous distinction between 
strategy and tactics, concluding that resistance can always find a place in the ambiguities 
and opacities of power’s technocratic transparency. This is also Thrift’s (1997) answer, 
which pays indeed attention to everyday, ordinary, less-than-heroic acts of resistance 
(Thrift 1997). Another, complementary way to look at the same question is to reframe it 
in a less either-or logic. Success and failure of resistances can neither be easily defined 
nor measured. As Routledge (1997, 69) suggests, resistances are fluid processes, whose 
emergence and dissolution cannot be fixed at points in time. Similarly, resistance and 
power do not exist as separated categories, being in fact closely entangled in ambiguous 
relations (Sharp et al. 2000) – something which should warn about the risk of 
romanticizing the emancipatory and progressive potential of any resistance (Moore 
1997).  The OBZ movement offers evidence to support all these perspectives, while 
confirming at the same time Routledge’s (1997, 83) intuition about the impracticality of 
capturing resistance within an overarching theory, as resistance will always be dependent 
on the contingency of the chosen terrains. 
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Figure 1. Map of Old Nicosia showing the border crossings (source: Nicosia Master Plan 
Archive, edited. Scale 1:10,000) 
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Figure 2. Nicosia. Memorializing the Greek Cypriot border landscape (Author’s photo) 
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Figure 3. Nicosia. The TRNC check-point at Ledra Palace crossing (Author’s photo) 
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Figure 4. OBZ movement: ‘No-borders’ slogans (Mihalis Eleftheriou’s photo) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Footage of the first day this protest is available on the movement’s webpage: 
http://occupythebufferzone.wordpress.com/videos/  
 
2
 OBZ has a website (http://occupythebufferzone.wordpress.com/), a Facebook page 
(http://www.facebook.com/OccupyBufferZone) and can also be followed on Twitter 
(http://twitter.com/OccupyBufferZ). Besides various Cypriot newspapers, the voice of the activists has also 
been heard on Turkish TV channels (NTV) and newspapers (Hürriyet), and Greek newspapers 
(Kathimerini). Also international news agency (Reuters) and TVs (Al Jazeera and PressTV) have hosted the 
opinions of the activists (see a complete list on the OBZ website).  
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